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Debunking Material Induction 
Induction is indispensable in the sciences and in daily life. Yet, it continues to be a scandal in 
philosophy. Over the last 15 years, John Norton has been developing and defending an account 
of induction that substantially reduces its mysteriousness and makes its justifying power easier to 
see. His key insight is to treat the goodness of inductive inferences as a local matter. On 
Norton’s material theory of induction (Norton 2003, 2010, 2011, 2014, and forthcoming), there 
is no globally-applicable, formal rule of induction, and no universal fact that underwrites all 
good inductive inferences. Rather, a good inductive inference is powered by local matters of fact 
specific to that inference or to a restricted family of similar inferences.  
 Of course, Norton is not without critics,1 but we think that he has adequately addressed 
the standard objections to his theory. Moreover, we think that the material theory throws 
substantial light on our inductive practices and is enormously useful for inquiries in the history 
and philosophy of science.2 Nevertheless, we think that lying at the heart of Hume’s skeptical 
attack on induction is a challenge that the material theory is not equipped to handle. In this paper, 
we advance an explanatory problem of induction and argue that our explanatory problem 
threatens even accounts (like Norton’s) on which there is no universal, formal rule of induction. 
 Here is how we proceed. In Section 1, we sketch a standard formulation of the problem of 
induction and show how the material theory is meant to solve it, and in Section 2 we review 
Norton’s responses to a common objection to the solution. We then lay out our explanatory 
formulation of the problem of induction in Section 3, and we address some candidate responses 
to the problem in Sections 4-5. 
                                                 
1 For examples, see Achinstein (2010), Kelly (2010), Steel (2005), and Worrall (2010). 
2 Cf. Livengood and Edwards (forthcoming). 
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1. The Material Theory of Induction 
To illustrate the difference between formal and material theories of induction, consider 
the following two inferences: 
[T1] On all past occasions, there has been exactly one low tide on the Thames at London 
Bridge during daylight hours. 
 
T ============== 
 [T2] Tomorrow, there will be exactly one low tide on the Thames at London Bridge 
 during daylight hours. 
 
 [B1] On all past occasions, samples of bismuth have melted when heated to 271.4° C. 
B ============== 
 [B2] On the next occasion, bismuth will melt when heated to 271.4° C. 
 
 
Both [T] and [B] are valid inductive inferences.3 On a formal theory of induction, what makes 
these inferences valid is that they conform to a rule of inductive inference. Perhaps both 
inferences are instances of the same universal formal rule (such as a rule that allows one to infer 
that some property will be instantiated on the next occasion from the fact that it has been 
instantiated on all past occasions) or perhaps there is a different rule that underwrites each 
inference. On the material theory, what makes [T] a valid inference is the fact that the Thames is 
an estuary river and estuary rivers generally have regular tides. What makes [B] a valid inference 
is that bismuth is an element and a sample of a given element generally has the same melting 
point as other samples of that element. In both cases, local material facts power the inferences. 
In addition to the question of what makes an inductive inference valid, there is a question 
of when one is justified in drawing the inference. Norton isn’t explicit about this, but we think 
                                                 
3 We follow Norton (2014, 672) in using “valid” to characterize inductive inferences as well as deductive inferences. 
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the right thing for the material theorist to say is that one is justified in drawing such inferences 
only if one is justified in believing that the underwriting material facts obtain.4 After all, if one 
has no reason to believe that samples of a single element generally have the same melting point, 
one wouldn’t be justified in inferring [B2] from [B1]. 
 To see the material theory in action, let’s consider an argument for inductive skepticism 
that it’s tailor-made to handle. Let a predictive inference be an inductive inference about how 
things will be in the future.5 Let the Principle of Induction [PI] be the proposition that the future 
will be like the past.6 Then the skeptic argues as follows that no predictive inference can be 
justified: 
 [S1] [PI] cannot be justified. 
[S2]  If so, then no inference that presupposes [PI] is justified. 
[S3] Every predictive inference presupposes [PI].  
 -------------------------- 
 [S4] No predictive inference is justified. 
 
 
The usual motivation for [S1] is that, since [PI] is neither a priori nor directly given in 
experience, it would have to be justified on the basis of an inductive inference. But any such 
inference would either have to be underwritten by [PI] itself, rendering the inference viciously 
circular or have to be underwritten by some further principle that would itself have to be 
underwritten by some still further principle (on pain of circularity), and so on vitiose ad 
                                                 
4 Cf. Kelly (2010, 759-760). 
5 See Salmon (1981), contra Popper (1972), on the centrality of such inferences to scientific inquiry. 
6 Alternatively, one might characterize the Principle of Induction in terms of the idea that nature is uniform. We 
don’t think anything that we say hangs on going one way rather than the other. 
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infinitum. Premiss [S2] is a special case of the more general principle that no inference with an 
unjustifiable presupposition is justified.  
 As for [S3], one can see why proponents of formal theories of induction seem compelled 
to accept it (or something like it). By their lights, [PI] (or some closely associated rule of 
inference) is what licenses the move from propositions about the past and present to propositions 
about the future in predictive inferences like [T] and [B] above. According to the material theory, 
by contrast, [S3] is false. [T] is underwritten by a local material fact about tides, [B] is 
underwritten by a local material fact about elements, and neither presupposes anything as general 
as [PI]. Indeed, the proponent of the material theory can happily accept that [PI] is far too vague 
(as stated) to explain which inductive inferences are and aren’t valid, and is spared the 
embarrassment of having to identify some more precise or nuanced general rule of induction that 
won’t (for instance) license the conclusion that there will never be a cure for cancer or that we 
will never turn 60 (since on all our past birthdays…). 
2. Resisting a Material Regress 
 Some may naturally wonder whether the material theory faces a regress of its own. As we 
saw, an inference like [B] is justified on the material theory only if one is justified in believing 
the material fact that underwrites it: namely, that samples of a given element generally have the 
same melting point as other samples of that element. Following Norton, let’s call such claims 
about how things generally are “material postulates,” and let’s call this particular material 
postulate [B*]. What justifies us in believing [B*]? It would have to be some further material 
postulates, for instance that samples of a given element generally have the same microscopic 
structure and that things with the same microscopic structure generally agree in their physical 
properties (see Norton 2014, 676).  
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Now the regress is in motion. For one can ask what justifies us in believing those further 
material postulates and what justifies the postulates that justify them and so on. The chain of 
material postulates can’t go on forever. So there would seem to be two possibilities. The first is 
that it circles back on itself, with some postulate underwriting the very inferences that ultimately 
justify us in accepting that very postulate. The second is that the chain of postulates terminates in 
some collection of first postulates, with no prior postulates to justify them. But if the first 
postulates aren’t themselves justified by postulates, then they aren’t justified. After all, the 
postulates that power inductive inferences are neither a priori nor directly given in experience, 
and therefore, they can only be justified by inductive inferences which (by hypothesis) must be 
powered by postulates.  
Norton addresses such worries, rejecting the underlying “hierarchical” conception of 
justification.7 But rather than appealing to a Quinean web to illustrate the holistic nature of 
justification, his preferred metaphor is that of a stone arch, with each stone figuring in the 
explanation of what holds the others in place (2014, §10). Crossword puzzles can serve the same 
illustrative purpose. When a completed puzzle yields sensible answers to all of the clues, each 
answer is justified at least in large part by its coherence with the rest of the answers—even if the 
answer to any one clue, taken in isolation, is only a guess.8  
The material postulates that figure in the justification of inductive inferences likewise, by 
Norton’s lights, form “an inductively self-supporting system of propositions” (2014, 686). He 
gives numerous examples of nonhierarchical “cross-overs”: 
When we infer inductively from the observed positions of Venus to the elliptical orbit 
that fits them, we select an ellipse from all possible curves, on the warrant of Newton’s 
inverse square law of gravity that entails that planets orbit in ellipses. Yet Newton’s law 
                                                 
7 He also challenges the claim that postulates cannot be directly justified by experience, as resting on the myth of the 
given; see his 2014, §9. 
8 Haack (1993, Chapter 4) develops the crossword puzzle analogy in detail. See also, Huemer (2001, 40-41). 
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can have the benefit of inductive support from the very ellipses whose fitting it warrants. 
(2014, 684) 
 
Multiple crossings over of support relations are a commonplace of science. It is quite 
visible in the interactions among different sciences, both in general and narrow 
propositions. Each science, for example, is confident that the general principle of the 
conservation of energy holds within its domain. It draws that confidence, in part, from 
knowing that energy conservation holds within the other sciences. (2014, 686) 
 
In the case at hand, then, the idea would be that what justifies us in believing [B*] is its 
coherence with a wide range of further postulates; and the justification for any one of those other 
postulates is its coherence with the rest, including [B*] itself.9 
 We think Norton’s response to the regress objection is satisfying, though we might 
quibble with some of the details. We want to be clear about this because one might be tempted to 
read our explanatory objection as a variation on the regress objection. To preview what we say in 
the next two sections, the explanatory objection is importantly different from regress objections 
both in terms of what it concedes to Norton and in terms of the challenge it raises. The 
explanatory objection concedes that when people draw predictive inferences, they are typically 
justified in exactly the way the material theory suggests. We are not demanding a justification in 
a way that leads to a regress. Rather, the explanatory objection advances a defeater that, once 
brought to our attention, undermines whatever justification we might otherwise have for our 
beliefs. 
3. An Explanatory Constraint on Rational Belief 
In this section, we lay the groundwork for an explanatory problem of induction. Our 
formulation of the problem is inspired by our reading of Hume, which is similar to Jacobson’s 
                                                 
9 One may naturally wonder whether the appeal to coherence would be equally effective in vindicating formal 
theories. Norton will likely deny that it would: his “arch” is a completed structure (viz. mature science) whose parts 
clearly support each other, whereas the formal theorist has little more than three rocks arranged hopefully (viz. a 
small supply of ill-defined formal rules). Cf. his 2014, 676.  
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(1987) reading, and by recent debunking arguments against moral realism, for which see, e.g., 
Street (2006) and Joyce (2006).10  The problem is generated by an explanatory constraint on 
rational belief, which we formulate as follows:  
[EXC]  If S believes that there is no appropriate explanatory connection between her belief  
 that p and the fact that p, then S is not rationally entitled to believe that p. 
 
In other words, recognizing that some beliefs lack an appropriate explanatory connection to the 
facts that they purport to be about serves as a defeater for those beliefs. (We will say more later on 
about what might count as an “appropriate” connection.) 
 Some may reject the need for any such constraint out of hand. Indeed, they may reject it 
precisely on the grounds that it seems to preclude predictive inferences.11 There are, however, 
several excellent reasons for thinking that there must be some such explanatory constraint on 
rational belief, which we’ll survey momentarily. But before motivating [EXC], let us get clearer 
on what it does and doesn’t demand. 
 First, [EXC] does not demand that anyone positively believe that there is an explanatory 
connection between their beliefs and the relevant facts, thus avoiding the implication that very 
young children—who do not yet have any beliefs about explanation—are not rationally entitled to 
any of their beliefs. Second, [EXC] does not have the implication that one has to establish that 
there is an explanatory connection or spell out how such connection works in order to believe 
rationally. Our ancient ancestors, lacking any good explanation of how perception works, were 
still rationally entitled to their perceptual beliefs, since they (presumably) didn’t positively deny 
that worldly facts explained their perceptual beliefs. Third, [EXC] does not demand that there 
actually be an explanatory connection between one’s beliefs and the facts. Accordingly, it does 
                                                 
10 See Setiya (2012) and Dogramaci (2016) on the connection between moral debunking and inductive skepticism. 
11 See, e.g., White (2010, 582-583) and Fairchild and Hawthorne (2018, 52). 
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not entail that brains in vats lack rational entitlement to their external-world beliefs. What [EXC] 
does say is that for an epistemic agent to have rational entitlement to believe a given proposition, 
she cannot believe that her belief is disconnected from the relevant fact.12 
 Why accept [EXC]? We find the idea of an explanatory constraint on rational belief 
obvious and compelling. But there are several ways to motivate an explanatory constraint that 
should appeal even to those who do not find it so obvious and compelling. In the rest of this 
section, we canvas three reasons to accept—or at least take very seriously—the claim that there 
is an explanatory constraint on rational belief substantially similar to [EXC]: first, an explanatory 
constraint on rational belief may be motivated by way of an explanatory constraint on evidence; 
second, an explanatory constraint on rational belief may be motivated by way of non-accidental-
connection constraints on knowledge; and third, an explanatory constraint on rational belief may 
be motivated by way of accounting for the epistemic force of access challenges.13 We expect that 
each way of motivating an explanatory constraint on rational belief could be developed in several 
different ways. For each of the three routes, we try to provide a clear, concrete way of arguing 
for [EXC], but we hope that if our specific arguments are found wanting, the general ideas will 
remain plausible. 
 Let’s begin by considering an explanatory constraint on evidence. A version of such a 
constraint may be found in Section 4 of Hume’s Enquiry. After giving some examples of 
inferences to “absent facts,” Hume writes (Section IV, Part 1, Paragraph 22, Pages 26-27): 
All our reasonings concerning fact are of the same nature. And here it is constantly 
supposed that there is a connexion between the present fact and that which is inferred from 
                                                 
12 Although “disconnected” is not strictly-speaking synonymous with “not appropriately connected,” if a belief is 
not appropriately connected to the relevant fact, we will sometimes say that the two are disconnected. 
13 In addition to the three reasons we discuss, we think that an explanatory constraint on rational belief provides a 
compelling diagnosis of what is wrong with some intuitively objectionable theoretical maneuvers, such as level-
splitting with respect to higher-order evidence (for discussion of which, see Horowitz, 2014). But we do not develop 
this further reason here. 
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it. Were there nothing to bind them together, the inference would be entirely precarious. 
The hearing of an articulate voice and rational discourse in the dark assures us of the 
presence of some person: Why? because these are the effects of the human make and fabric, 
and closely connected with it. If we anatomize all the other reasonings of this nature, we 
shall find that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect, and that this relation is 
either near or remote, direct or collateral. Heat and light are collateral effects of fire, and 
the one effect may justly be inferred from the other. 
 
The idea seems to be that for any given inference, if our evidence had no appropriate explanatory 
connection to what we infer from it, then the inference would only yield a true conclusion by 
chance. The success of an inference that drew a true conclusion would be unstable, fragile. Hence, 
disconnected evidence provides no reason for belief. 
 Achinstein (2008, 344-345) develops and defends an explicit explanatory constraint on 
evidence beginning with the idea that the function of evidence (especially in the sciences) is to 
provide us (scientists) with good reason to believe a hypothesis. Put more precisely, Achinstein’s 
good-reason-to-believe assumption says that e is evidence that h (given b) only if (given b) e 
provides a good reason to believe h. After discussing some attempts to satisfy the good-reason-to-
believe assumption and showing how they fail, Achinstein proposes a principle that satisfies the 
good-reason-to-believe assumption by tying together (1) the fact that e is a good reason to believe 
h and (2) the probability of there being an explanatory connection between h and e.14 The result is 
an explanatory constraint on the nature of evidence: some proposition e is evidence for some other 
proposition h only if there is a high enough probability (greater than ½) that there is an explanatory 
connection between h and e, given e and the rest of our background beliefs (346). 
 Our explanatory constraint on rational belief does not immediately follow from 
Achinstein’s explanatory constraint on evidence. But the two are related by way of an epistemic 
                                                 
14 Regarding explanatory connection, Achinstein writes (346), “There is an explanatory connection between h and e 
if and only if h correctly explains why e is true, or if e correctly explains why h is true, or if some hypothesis 
correctly explains both why e is true and why h is true.” 
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instrument principle, according to which if S has good reason (all things considered) to believe 
some proposition p, then the fact that [S believes that p] is evidence that p is the case.15 Now, if 
the fact that [S believes that p] is explanatorily disconnected from the fact that p, then according 
to Achinstein’s constraint, the fact that [S believes that p] is not evidence that p. If the fact that [S 
believes that p] is not evidence that p, then it follows from the epistemic instrument principle that 
S does not have good reason (all things considered) to believe that p. And if S comes to believe 
that she does not have good reason (all things considered) to believe that p, then she has a defeater 
for her belief that p, just as [EXC] maintains. 
 A second reason to take an explanatory constraint on rational belief seriously is that an 
explanatory constraint on rational belief follows from a non-accidental-connection constraint on 
knowledge.16 Knowing that p requires that it not be an accident that one correctly believes that p.17 
Many philosophers have urged that non-accidental connection should be understood in modal 
terms. 18  But Setiya (2012, 89-99) and Faraci (2019, 10-15) argue that the operative sort of 
accidental connection cannot be cashed out that way and must instead be understood in explanatory 
terms. If that’s right, then a no-accidental-connection constraint on knowing amounts to an 
explanatory-connection constraint on knowing. To get from there to [EXC], two things are needed. 
                                                 
15 The epistemic instrument principle could be stated in terms of the reliability of the epistemic agent, but we worry 
that appealing to reliability in this context will naturally suggest a modal account that we do not endorse. Probably, 
the principle should also be restricted to agents other than S, but that restriction doesn’t matter to our argument here. 
16 One way of spelling out a non-accidental-connection constraint is in terms of causal connection. One of the 
authors of this paper thinks that causal accounts of knowledge are still worth considering, despite the fact that the 
literature seems to have moved on. If you think that there is something right about a causal account of knowledge, 
then notice that on a causal account, if you come to recognize that a belief is causally disconnected from the fact 
believed, then you gain a defeater for that belief, just as you would if you recognized that some other condition on 
knowledge (such as truth) was not met. But since appropriate causal connection is a kind of explanatory connection, 
[EXC] follows immediately from a causal account of knowledge.  
17 Unger (1967) claims that being non-accidentally connected to the fact believed is a necessary condition for a 
belief to count as knowledge. Unger (1968) claims that knowledge just is non-accidental belief.  
18 Pritchard (2005, 2007, 2009) is probably the most prominent example. See Faraci (2019) for more examples. 
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First, we need the following plausible principle connecting constraints on knowledge and 
constraints on rational belief: 
 For all constraints K on knowing and all propositions p, if you come to believe that your 
 belief that p does not satisfy K, then you have a defeater for your belief that p. 
 
Second, we need a more precise formulation of explanatory construal of accidental connection: 
one’s belief that p is accidentally true if there is no explanatory connection between the belief that 
p and the fact that p.19 Together with a no-accidental-connection constraint on knowledge, these 
yield the result that if you come to believe that one of your beliefs is not explanatorily connected 
to the fact believed, then you have a defeater for that belief. But if you have a defeater for the belief 
that p, then you are not rationally entitled to believe that p, just as [EXC] says. 
 A third reason to accept that there is an explanatory constraint on rational belief is that such 
constraints play an indispensable role in well-known and prima facie forceful access challenges in 
the philosophy of mathematics (due to Benacerraf 1973). We know that three is odd and greater 
than two. But if—as Platonists would have it—this is a fact about the features of, and relations 
among, intangible, mind-independent, and causally inert objects, it’s difficult to see how we know 
that three is odd and greater than two. The relevant facts are inaccessible on a Platonist view. 
Recognizing the inaccessibility of these truths, the Platonist seems rationally committed to 
suspending her mathematical beliefs, or else abandoning the Platonist commitments that generated 
the problem in the first place. What is it, though, that drives the Platonist to skepticism? Here is a 
natural answer: It would be irrational to retain beliefs that you come to think are not in any way 
explanatorily connected to their subject matter. In other words, an explanatory constraint on 
rational belief drives the access problem. Other answers have been offered. For instance, Hartry 
Field (1989) frames the problem as a challenge to explain the reliability of mathematical beliefs. 
                                                 
19 Though see Setiya (2012: 96) for a more nuanced construal. 
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But, as others have argued, it is trivially easy to meet this challenge (given the necessity of 
mathematical truths).20 The access problem has no bite unless it’s underwritten by something like 
[EXC]. But it does have bite. So something like [EXC] must be true. 
4. The Missing Explanatory Connection 
 Having seen some motivations for [EXC], we are now ready to formulate an explanatory 
problem of induction:  
[G1]  There is no explanatory connection between our beliefs about the future and the  
  future facts, and we recognize that this is the case. 
 
 [G2]  If [G1], then we are not rationally entitled to retain our beliefs about the future. 
 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 [G3]  We are not rationally entitled to retain our beliefs about the future. 
 
 
Premiss [G2] is an immediate entailment of our explanatory constraint, [EXC]. As for [G1], unless 
we admit backwards causation or something similar, it is hard to see how future facts could explain 
our beliefs about the future. And except for a very restricted category of predictive inferences 
having to do with how we ourselves will act in the future, it is hard to see how our beliefs might 
explain any future facts. Specifically in the Thames and bismuth cases, we don’t see how the fact 
that we believe that there will be a low tide tomorrow could explain the fact that there will be one 
or how the fact that we believe that a sample of bismuth will melt at a specific temperature 
tomorrow could explain the fact that it will melt at that temperature.  If facts about the future 
neither explain nor are explained by our beliefs about the future, then there would seem to be no 
explanatory connection between them, just as [G1] says.  
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Pust (2004), Baras (2017), and Clarke-Doane (forthcoming). 
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The material theory of induction is not equipped to answer this explanatory problem of 
induction. Consider again the predictive inference [T] that concludes with the proposition that 
tomorrow, there will be exactly one low tide on the Thames at London Bridge during daylight 
hours. Suppose we think inference [T] is reasonable, and having drawn it, we come to believe that 
tomorrow, there will be exactly one low tide on the Thames at London Bridge during daylight 
hours. Up to this point, our belief is rationally permissible (as far as [EXC] and [G2] are 
concerned). We are justified in believing that there will be exactly one low tide on the Thames 
tomorrow. When asked for our justification, we may respond just as Norton suggests, citing facts 
about estuary rivers and tides. But suppose we now consider the question of whether there is any 
explanatory connection between the fact of our belief and the fact believed. If, on reflection, we 
were to come to believe that there is no such connection, then we would have to give up our belief 
about tomorrow’s tide. The justification that once secured our belief vanishes. 
This highlights the main difference between the explanatory problem of induction and 
traditional formulations. Traditional formulations aim to show that beliefs based on predictive 
inference were never justified to begin with. The explanatory formulation aims to show that our 
ordinary sources of justification are undermined, or defeated, by explanatory revelations—which 
is entirely compatible with holding that the beliefs were justified prior to defeat. (By way of 
analogy, consider two sorts of skeptical attacks on some intuition-driven metaphysical principle. 
The first attack denies that intuition ever justified the principle in the first place. The second 
concedes that intuition is a source of prima facie justification, but insists that once we appreciate 
the unreliability of intuition, that justification is undermined.) 
The aforementioned motivation for [G1]—namely, that the future tides don’t cause our 
beliefs about future tides, and vice versa—is admittedly oversimplified. After all, there are other 
14 
 
ways for a pair of facts to be explanatorily connected. Even if the former don’t explain the latter 
or vice versa, the idea goes, there may nevertheless be some further fact serving as a “third-factor” 
that explains both. Indeed, this is Goldman’s (1967) strategy for accommodating inductive 
knowledge within a causal theory of knowledge, and it is a prominent strategy for resisting 
explanatory challenges in metaethics (e.g., Enoch 2010 and Wielenberg 2010). What might the 
third factor be that is supposed to explain both beliefs about the future and the future facts? We 
turn now to two strategies for resisting [G1] by identifying some such third factor. 
The first candidate is [PI] itself, the fact that the future will resemble the past. That the 
future will be like the past (together with the fact that there have been regular tides in the past) 
explains the fact that there will be a low tide on the Thames tomorrow. And that the future will be 
like the past explains our belief that there will be a low tide tomorrow by way of natural selection. 
A creature that expects future states to resemble past states (in relevant respects) is bound to 
outperform one that lacks this expectation. And why is that? Because the future does resemble the 
past. In the memorable words of Quine (1969, 13): “Creatures inveterately wrong in their 
inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind.” 
 Here is the problem with this line of reasoning (cf. Setiya 2012, 106-107). The putative 
fact that the future resembles the past is no part of the evolutionary explanation for why our 
inductive practices enhanced reproductive success for our ancestors. Rather, the explanation is that 
their future (a.k.a. the distant past) resembled their past (a.k.a. the somewhat more distant past). 
The facts about our future (a.k.a. the future) have no role to play in the evolutionary explanation; 
the evolutionary explanation features only facts about the past. Hence, the principle of induction 
cannot serve as a third factor explaining both our beliefs about the future and the future facts (since 
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it doesn’t explain our beliefs). Therefore, the principle of induction cannot serve as grounds for 
denying [G1].  
 The second strategy we’ll consider points to the laws of nature as the third factor explaining 
both our beliefs about the future and the future facts. According to this second strategy, the laws 
figure in the explanation of why the tides behave as they do and, in particular, why there will be 
exactly one low tide tomorrow. Additionally, the laws explain the regularities we have observed 
in the behavior of the tides, which in turn explain why we form the beliefs we do about future 
tides.21 
 This strategy is evidently available only to those who accept a “governing” conception of 
laws, according to which the laws are not merely regularities or descriptions thereof but rather 
some further thing underwriting and explaining those regularities. The strategy won’t work in a 
nongoverning, Humean framework, since it won’t be true that the tides behave as they do because 
the laws are as they are, and we lose the envisaged third-factor explanation. So for the sake of 
argument, let’s assume that a governing account of the laws of nature is correct. We will argue 
that even if one accepts a governing account of laws, law-based third-factor explanations fail. As 
with the first strategy we considered, which appeals to the principle of induction, the core problem 
with the second strategy is that our beliefs are explained by the laws up to now, while the future 
facts are explained by the laws in the future. But before developing our argument, we want to 
briefly review a related criticism of a governing-law justification of induction. 
 Beebee (2011) considers two strategies for justifying induction by way of an appeal to laws 
of nature. Each strategy deploys the same basic inference pattern: use inference to the best 
explanation to infer the existence of a law of nature (which involves some kind of natural 
                                                 
21 Cf. Setiya (2012, 106-107) and Fairchild and Hawthorne (2018: 52). 
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necessity), and then deduce unobserved instances of the law. Beebee argues that the inference to 
the best explanation fails to deliver necessary connections in the future. We want to explain some 
observations that we have made. But from a “neutral” starting point—one where we neither believe 
nor doubt any proposition about the character of the laws—we have no reason to think that a 
timeless law, as opposed to a time-restricted law, does a better job explaining our observations. As 
Beebee puts it (510): “If all we are trying to explain is the fact that the observed Fs have been Gs, 
then the hypothesis that F and G have been necessarily connected so far is surely just as good a 
candidate explanation as the hypothesis that F and G are timelessly necessarily connected.” 
 The question of whether an explanation in terms of time-restricted laws is as good as or 
better than an explanation in terms of timeless laws is a difficult one. But we do not need to address 
it here because our objection to a governing-law approach to justifying predictive inference has a 
different starting point than Beebee’s and so must make use of different machinery. Beebee is 
considering an explanatory inference from a neutral starting point. But our explanatory constraint 
does not presuppose that we are starting from a neutral position. We need to consider the possibility 
that one is already committed to the existence of a specific law of nature, which one could then 
call on to provide the missing explanatory connection between one’s beliefs about the future and 
the future facts.22 We think that even in cases where one is initially justified in believing that there 
is a law of nature that entails both some future facts and one’s beliefs about those facts, the 
explanatory challenge is not satisfactorily met. To see how this could be the case, we need to 
follow a brief digression into the relation between explanation and coincidence. 
                                                 
22 Plausibly, when one sees that one had no good reason to infer a timeless law in the first place, but that a time-
restricted law was preferable, one ought to give up believing that the timeless law exists. But we will not press this 
challenge further here. 
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 David Faraci (2019), following Marc Lange (2010, 2016), argues that an explanation of 
some phenomenon shows it to be noncoincidental only if the explanation is sufficiently unified. 
Consider the following example from Faraci (2019, 6): 
It might seem quite the coincidence if you and [your colleague David] were in Minsk at 
the same time. We can offer the explanation: you are spending your sabbatical in Minsk, 
and [David is] on vacation in Minsk. Clearly, this does nothing to eliminate the 
coincidence. 
 
There’s some temptation to say this is no explanation at all. But even if the conjunctive fact that 
you’re on sabbatical there and David is on vacation there explains why you’re both in Minsk at 
the same time, you should not think the fact that you’re both in Minsk is noncoincidental. The 
conjunctive fact does not provide a logically or epistemologically satisfactory account of the fact 
that you are both in Minsk. So, the conjunctive fact does not dispel the appearance of 
coincidence.23 
Faraci suggests (and we agree) that the conjunctive explanation does not dispel the 
appearance of coincidence because your presence and David’s presence are being explained by 
different, separable conjuncts. The alleged explanation itself lacks the sort of unity required to 
properly bind together the fact that you are in Minsk and the fact that David is in Minsk. Faraci 
offers the following account of what it takes for an explanation of some phenomena to be unified: 
UNIFIED. E is a unified explanation for the members of Γ if and only if no isolable part of 
E explains some members of Γ at least as well as E but fails to explain other members of Γ 
at least as well as E.24 
 
                                                 
23 We want to be careful here. It is relatively easy to confuse (1) a metaphysical question about whether and under 
what conditions some fact is a coincidence, (2) a logical or epistemological question about whether and under what 
conditions one ought to think that some fact is a coincidence, and (3) a psychological question about whether and 
under what conditions one actually thinks that some fact is a coincidence. In this paper, we are concerned with the 
logical or epistemological question.  
24 See his (2019: 6 n.17) for some possible complications. 
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The explanation that David is on sabbatical in Minsk and you are on vacation in Minsk is not a 
unified explanation for {your being in Minsk, David’s being in Minsk}. That’s because the 
explanation has an isolable part (viz. the first conjunct) that explains one member of the 
explanandum (viz. that you are in Minsk) at least as well as the whole conjunction but fails to 
explain another member of the explanandum (viz. that David is in Minsk).  
The claim that disunified explanations shouldn’t dispel the appearance of coincidence 
guides our understanding of our explanatory constraint [EXC]. Recall that [EXC] prohibits 
believers from acknowledging the absence of an “appropriate” explanatory connection between 
belief and what’s believed. What’s an “appropriate” explanatory connection? At the very least, it 
should be one that reveals the accuracy of the belief to be noncoincidental. For, as we saw in §3, 
the explanatory constraint is closely associated with a non-accidentality constraint: one doesn’t 
know that p if it’s an accident (or a coincidence) that one has correct beliefs regarding p, and 
continued belief in p is not rational if one recognizes that belief in p is at best accidental (or 
coincidental).25 
Thus, the envisaged third-factor explanation in terms of the laws of nature serves as a 
reason to reject [G1] only if it qualifies as a unified explanation. We now argue that the strategy 
fails: the laws of nature are not unified in the relevant way. As applied to the Thames inference, 
the explanandum would be {there will be a low tide tomorrow, you believe that there will be a low 
tide tomorrow}, and the explanation is that the laws of nature are thus-and-so. We claim that 
different parts of the explanation are responsible for different members of the explanandum. As 
with the Quinean response, what explains (and explains just as well) your beliefs about future tides 
                                                 
25 See Korman and Locke (forthcoming: §8) for further reason to think that the explanatory constraint on rational 
belief is not satisfied by such third-factor explanations. 
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is that the laws of nature have been thus-and-so up to now, whereas what explains the facts about 
future tides is that the laws of nature are whatever they are in the future. 
 Do these count as “isolable parts” of the claim that the laws of nature are thus-and-so, in 
the sense required by UNIFIED? They aren’t conjuncts of the proffered explanation, so the 
application of UNIFIED to this case admittedly isn’t as straightforward as it is in Faraci’s Minsk 
example. Still, there is independent reason to adopt a liberal understanding of “isolable parts.” 
Consider the following imaginary version of what Turkheimer (2016) calls weak genetic 
explanation: 
Martia is a behavioral geneticist studying divorce. Last year, she collected data on 
divorce and genetics in seven European countries. All of the people in the seven countries 
Martia studied were genetically very similar to one another, and the divorce rate was the 
same in each country. Moreover, Martia found that in each of her seven samples, there 
was a statistically significant association between genes and divorce rate. Martia initially 
thought that there might be genes for divorce. But when she looked more closely at her 
data, she found that the specific genes that were significant in her model were entirely 
different for each country. 
 
That all of the people in the seven countries were genetically very similar to one another is a (weak) 
genetic explanation of the divorce rates. And yet, it’s a coincidence that the divorce rate is the 
same in each country. UNIFIED should capture why this is a coincidence, but in order to do so, we 
need to understand the specific, local genetic story for each country as an isolable part of the claim 
that all of the people in the seven countries were genetically very similar to one another. The need 
for a more flexible understanding of “isolable part” then clears the way for treating it’s a law that 
thus-and-so as decomposing into two isolable parts: that the laws have been thus-and-so and that 
the laws will be thus-and-so. 
 For these reasons, we contend that the envisaged third-factor explanation is insufficiently 
unified to render the connection between our beliefs about the future and the future facts 
20 
 
noncoincidental, and therefore, appealing to the laws fails to serve as the sort of “appropriate” 
explanatory connection required by [EXC]. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 Norton’s material theory of induction likely has the resources to address the problem of 
induction as traditionally understood. But we think that the material theory is not equipped to 
handle the explanatory problem of induction. Norton may well insist that the material theory was 
never meant to handle every problem of induction. Indeed, he is explicit that his goal is to 
address “a particular, brief demonstration of the impossibility of justifying any rule of inductive 
inference,” insisting that separate problems of induction must be taken one at a time if there is to 
be any progress on the matter, and lamenting that “too often, discussions of the problem bleed 
off into other problems attached to inductive inference … and then further into a vague 
foreboding that inductive inference is philosophically problematic in all its aspects” (2014: 674). 
We are sympathetic, and we don’t mean to suggest that it is a defect of the material theory that it 
is not equipped to block the explanatory problem.  
 Still, friends of predictive inference need to find something to say in response to the 
explanatory problem. We’ve seen that there are powerful reasons for thinking that there is some 
sort of explanatory constraint on justification—not to mention that the explanatory constraint that 
we have developed has clear, empiricist-friendly motivations of the sort that we think will be 
appealing to Norton and many other philosophers of science. Is there some way of amending the 
explanatory constraint, so that it retains its core virtues without leading to skepticism about 
predictive inference? We hope so, but it isn’t obvious how such an amendment might go. A 
flatfooted strategy would be to simply add a clause licensing inductive inferences: 
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[EXC'] If S believes that there is no appropriate explanatory connection between her belief 
that p and the fact that p and S has no beliefs q1…qn from which p follows 
inductively, then S is not rationally entitled to believe that p. 
 
But we find this sort of amendment unilluminating and seemingly ad hoc. What’s so special about 
beliefs formed by induction, that they are exempt from the explanatory constraint?  
One might suggest that predictive inferences aren’t special; they’re simply one case among 
many in which one believes some proposition p on the basis of beliefs that are themselves 
explanatorily connected to the associated facts. The belief that there will be a tide on the Thames 
tomorrow is based on the belief that there have been tides on all previous days, and while the 
former belief is not explanatorily connected to the associated future tidal facts, the latter belief is 
explanatorily connected to the associated past tidal facts and supports the former belief. This 
suggests a somewhat different amendment: 
[EXC''] If S believes that there is no appropriate explanatory connection between her belief 
that p and the fact that p and S believes that she has no beliefs q1…qn that (i) support 
p and (ii) are explained by facts q1…qn, then S is not rationally entitled to believe 
that p.26 
 
Since we do take there to be beliefs about past tides that explain our beliefs about past tides and 
that (inductively) support our beliefs about future tides, [EXC''] won’t prescribe withholding belief 
about future tides.  
 But [EXC''] is problematic as well, since it threatens to make it trivially easy to avoid the 
access problems discussed in Section 3. For instance, take some utterly mundane reason to think 
that it’s wrong to set fire to cats, for instance that it’s quite painful for them. By the lights of 
[EXC''], even if you concede that there is no explanatory connection whatsoever between your 
moral beliefs and the moral facts, your belief that it’s wrong to set fire to cats is in good standing 
so long as you accept that your beliefs about what’s painful for cats are explained by facts about 
                                                 
26 See Korman (2019: 356) for a proposal along these lines. 
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what is painful for them. One might respond that whatever support beliefs about pain ordinarily 
supply for beliefs about wrongness is undercut by the explanatory concession that one has no 
access to moral facts. And rightly so! But [EXC''] is powerless to explain why it’s undercut. 
 We’re not sure whether to be optimistic or pessimistic about the prospects of finding an 
induction-friendly explanatory constraint that can do the work that an explanatory constraint needs 
to do. We leave it as an open problem to find one. 
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